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Summary 
The focus of the present paper is the topic of financial stability and the effects of existing 
regulation mechanisms. Investment decisions made by financial institutions generate 
aggregate risk, which poses a threat of systemic collapse. Conceptually this process has been 
regarded as a negative externality. The present thesis explores to what extent the Basel III 
requirements provide optimal microprudential regulation and are able to secure financial 
stability. This is done by the means of a theoretical model representing an aggregation of 
banks that differ in their ability to handle risk, which cannot be improved upon. Each bank 
has a choice between safe and risky investments and has to make a decision on the proportion 
between the two alternatives in the asset portfolio. The risky asset generates a higher return, 
but increases the probability of going bankrupt for an individual bank. The aggregate amount 
of investment in the risky asset determines the level of systemic risk. At the same time banks 
may decrease the probability of going bankrupt by increasing the proportion of equity in the 
liability structure. However, this is associated with a cost, because investors demand a higher 
return on capital than on demand deposits. It is suggested that investors may pose “market 
capital requirements”: demand more equity if a bank increases the amount of risky 
investment. The problem is formalized mathematically as a Net Present Value function that 
each bank seeks to maximize.  
Given the model above, three different regulation mechanisms are considered with 
reference to the Basel III Accord: the liquidity ratio, risk-weighted capital requirements and 
the leverage ratio. The regulation alternatives are formulated mathematically and the problem 
is solved by the means of control theory, where the social planner finds an optimal path of 
liquidity and capital requirements. Specifically, it is shown that under perfect information 
Pareto optimality may be achieved with the help of a combination of liquidity regulation and 
risk-weighted capital requirements that both decrease in risk handling ability. In other words, 
banks that are good at risk handling are allowed to hold less liquidity and less capital as a 
fraction of their assets and liabilities respectively. Under asymmetric information, however, 
financial institutions that are bad at risk handling acquire incentives to mimic institutions that 
are good at risk handling in order to increase their revenues and save on capital. Such 
incentives are strongest when liquidity regulation is used in a combination with either the 
leverage ratio or risk-weighted capital requirements that decrease in risk handling ability. In 
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order to prevent excessive aggregate risk accumulation and secure financial stability, the 
regulators may choose to equalize liquidity requirements for banks with different risk 
handling ability and use the latter in a combination with the leverage ratio. This results in 
inefficient risk sharing, suboptimal liquidity and capital buffers, at least for some banks. 
Alternatively, the regulators may choose to use liquidity requirements that decrease in risk 
handling ability in a combination with equal capital requirements for all banks. Depending on 
the strictness of the latter this may result in suboptimal liquidity and capital buffers, 
inefficient risk sharing or contribute to general underinvestment. The thesis thus shows that 
when the main source of heterogeneity across financial institutions is the ability to handle 
risk, the existing regulation requirements cannot achieve the first-best solution. In particular, 
they always produce suboptimal capital and/or liquidity buffers, at least for some banks. This 
is because financial stability is secured through what is known as “bunching”: treating 
different financial institutions alike.  
Since the latest Basel Accords are expected to be fully implemented in 2018, the 
predictions of the model are compared to the currently observed trends in the financial sector. 
Specifically, it has been noted that because of stricter risk-weighted capital requirements 
introduced by Basel III, banks have started a process of derisking of their assets. This might 
be an indicator of movement towards greater financial stability. At the same time concerns 
have been expressed as to whether financial activity may be simply migrating to the 
unregulated non-bank sector. Moreover, it is debated whether risk-weighted capital 
requirements introduced by Basel III are strict enough and will be able to combat excessive 
risk taking. Finally, it is uncertain whether Basel III has succeeded in providing incentives for 
truthful revelation of information. As long as banks have mimicking incentives, they will try 
to use any kind of “cosmetic adjustments” in order to maximize their profits at the cost of 
financial stability, which has been illustrated by the present thesis.      
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1 Introduction 
Since the global financial crisis of 2008 the concept of financial stability has attracted a lot of 
attention of theoreticians and policy makers. Generally financial stability has been defined as 
“the absence of imbalances in financial markets” (2003, Foot quoted in Haugland, Vikøren, 
2006, p. 26) or as a “condition in which the financial system – comprising of financial 
intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures – is capable of withstanding shocks” 
(European Central Bank, 2014). The incidence of the latest financial crisis has once again 
demonstrated that market outcomes are inefficient posing a threat of systemic risk 
accumulation. Even individual bank failures “could set off a chain reaction that may 
undermine the stability of the financial system” (Berger et al., 1995, p. 17). The latter may 
affect sustainable economic growth and development and generates in any case a social cost 
in form of an economic downturn. The existence of systemic risk may therefore justify 
regulation of the financial sector provided that it “can improve efficiency in a way that 
outweighs the costs of regulation” (Borchgrevink et al., 2013, p. 1). At the same time the 
view that financial regulation is desired is not shared universally. Diamond and Rajan (2001) 
argue, for instance, that financial fragility is actually necessary, because it disciplines banks, 
while regulation may harm the economy. Nevertheless, policy makers have made several 
attempts at creating global regulatory framework, the most extensive being the Basel Accords. 
Its goal is to “ensure that financial institutions internalize the risks and explicit or implicit 
costs of their business activities” (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2012, p. 76), so that 
the financial sector becomes safer and more sound. Expected to be fully implemented by 2018 
the latest Basel III requirements have already been subject to discussions as to whether the 
financial sector is indeed heading in the direction of greater financial stability.   
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct theoretical modeling of the financial sector in 
order to discuss possible effects of the new regulation standards and compare those to 
currently observed trends. This is an uneasy task, since the financial system is inherently 
complex and every financial institution is faced with a large number of choice variables in its 
decision-making process. As pointed out by Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003, p. 49), “given its 
equity, the bank must decide how much to lend, how thoroughly to screen loan applicants, 
how much to retain in government T-bills, how many funds to acquire through deposits, what 
interest rate to charge on loans, and what interest rate to pay on deposits”. Only some of 
these issues will be dealt with in the present thesis, and the modeling choice has been based 
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on the belief that “capital and liquidity requirements are the main staple of financial 
regulation” (Brunnermeier et al., 2009, p. 45). Hence, the thesis focuses on microprudential 
regulation carrying the idea that “the robustness of the system as a whole is related to the 
strength of its individual members” (Goodhart et al., 2004, p. 597).  
To begin with, a comprehensive literature review on the topic of financial stability and 
bank regulation will be presented. Some background information on the already existing 
regulation of the financial sector will be given with the focus on the Basel Accords. 
Thereafter, a mathematical model representing an aggregation of banks will be outlined. 
Inspired by an article by Perotti and Suarez, the model will represent a reformulation and 
extension of their work. The main idea behind the theoretical construction in the present 
thesis is that the source of heterogeneity across financial institutions is the ability to handle 
risk that cannot be improved upon. Given the latter, each bank decides on the amount of risk 
in its asset portfolio, while the aggregate amount of investment in the risky asset defines the 
level of systemic risk. This model will be applied to illustrate several of the newest regulation 
mechanisms concerning both assets and liabilities as presented by the Basel III Accord, 
namely the liquidity coverage ratio, risk-weighted capital requirements and the leverage ratio. 
It will be shown that liquidity regulation in a combination with risk-weighted capital 
requirements can secure Pareto efficiency under perfect information. Under asymmetric 
information, however, banks will acquire incentives not to reveal their risk handling ability 
truthfully in order to generate higher profits. Specifically, it will be demonstrated that optimal 
liquidity regulation in a combination with the leverage ratio always gives banks mimicking 
incentives. The subsequent adjustment of risky investment as a result of such mimicking leads 
to a system collapse due to aggregate risk accumulation. In the case of risk-weighted capital 
requirements two possible alternatives will be treated: one where risk-weighted capital 
requirements decrease in risk handling ability and the other where risk-weighted capital 
requirements are set at the same level for all banks. The first case will turn out to produce 
same mimicking incentives and lead to excessive aggregate risk accumulation, while the 
second case may secure financial stability provided that capital requirements are set at a high 
enough level. The latter alternative will nevertheless generate a tradeoff, since banks that are 
good at risk handling will acquire an incentive to reduce their risky investments due to 
strictness of capital requirements. Finally, the thesis will compare predictions of the 
theoretical model with currently observed trends from the latest reports on financial stability 
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and discuss topics of optimal liquidity and capital buffers and efficiency of risk distribution as 
well as migration of financial activity to the non-bank sector.      
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2 Literature review 
Within the topic of financial stability it has been common to distinguish between individual 
bank crises and system collapse as a result of aggregate risk accumulation. The latter is often 
formally presented as a negative externality arising, for instance, due to high riskiness of 
banks’ assets, excessive reliance on short-term funding or banks’ lending decisions. The 
existing regulation requirements aim both at making individual institutions more sound and 
the financial network as a whole safer. The following literature review presents models and 
contributions on bank crises and systemic risk modeling and proposed regulation mechanisms 
that could secure financial stability.  
One strand of theoretical literature focuses on the problem of liquidity as a primary 
source of financial instability. A paper by Perotti and Suarez that inspired the present thesis 
constructs a model, in which “short-term funding enables credit growth but generates 
negative systemic risk externalities” (Perotti, Suarez, 2011, p. 3). The authors suggest that by 
borrowing short banks are subject to refinancing risk, because “sudden withdrawals may lead 
to disruptive liquidity runs” (ibid., p. 4). The paper proposes liquidity regulation as a solution 
to such risk and compares the effectiveness of price and quantity mechanisms. It turns out that 
when “banks differ only in capacity to lend profitably” (ibid., p. 5), the regulator may 
effectively use Pigovian taxation in order to correct for the existing externality. On the other 
hand, when banks differ in risk-taking incentives, “such gambling incentives are not properly 
deterred by levies, while quantity constraints are more effective” (ibid., p. 6). An influential 
paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) points out that financial institutions suffer from a 
maturity mismatch investing long and borrowing short. A crisis in form of a bank run may 
happen when “sudden withdrawals can force the bank to liquidate many of its assets at a loss 
and to fail” (Diamond, Dybvig, 1983, p. 401). When such withdrawals first start, banks will 
use their liquidity buffers and if those turn out to be insufficient, they will be forced to 
liquidate long-term assets. Since the latter can only presumably be done at some cost, the 
bank may go bankrupt if too many long-term assets are sold. Under this set-up bank runs are a 
type of Nash equilibrium, so that “even “healthy” banks can fail” (ibid., p. 402). The idea of 
crisis as an equilibrium is also found in other papers, such as that by Morris and Shin (2008, 
p. 239), who regard systemic collapse as a coordination failure and argue that “policies that 
lower coordination threshold or the cost of miscoordination are likely to promote system 
stability”. In the Diamond Dybvig model, however, “it is only by coincidence that runs are 
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experienced by several banks at the same time” (Allen, Gale, 2007, p. 149), so the idea of 
systemic risk is not explicitly elaborated on. Allen and Gale (2007, p. 83) outline an 
alternative formulation of the Diamond Dybvig model, in which bank runs are “a natural 
outgrowth of weak fundamentals arising in the course of a business cycle”. In an economic 
downturn, if depositors start worrying that returns on assets may be significantly lower than 
expected, they will withdraw their money creating panic. In this view crises are “an integral 
part of the business cycle” (ibid.). A paper by Rochet and Vives (2004, p. 5) “builds a bridge 
between the “panic” and “fundamentals” view of crises by linking the probability of 
occurrence of a crisis to the fundamentals”. The authors argue for the existence of unique 
equilibria when investors have precise information about the condition of banks’ assets. 
However, when such information is uncertain and subject to speculation, “there is the 
potential for a coordination failure” (Rochet, Vives, 2004, p. 5). In terms of regulation the 
paper suggests that “liquidity and solvency regulation can solve the coordination problem but 
typically the cost is too high in terms of foregone returns” (ibid.). Of this reason regulation 
must be complemented with some sort of emergent help mechanisms. 
An alternative approach to financial stability is presented in a number of papers that 
relate it to banks’ investment decisions, particularly the riskiness of assets. A paper by 
Coulter, Mayer and Vickers (2013) sets up a model, in which banks choose between safe and 
risky investment alternatives. The latter decision generates systemic risk externality, but the 
level of aggregate risk may be lowered by increasing the amount of equity on the liability 
side. The paper shows that under some conditions, such as perfectly correlated risks of failure 
and no bail-outs, both taxation and capital requirements correct the externality equally well. 
However, “taxation increases debt funding needed per loan, which could exacerbate rather 
than diminish potential externality problems” (Coulter et al., 2013, p. 2). Moreover, the 
authors argue that systemic risk in the financial sector has certain special features, which 
make it different from other types of negative externalities. Of this reason taxation and 
regulation are not equivalent and “the conventional preference for capital regulation over 
taxation has a sound underlying rationale” (ibid.). A preference for capital regulation is also 
shared by Rafael Repullo (2002), who presents a dynamic model where banks can invest in 
two alternatives: safe and risky. Under this set-up two different equilibria are possible, 
defined as “prudent” and “gambling”, and their incidence depends on the level of competition 
among banks. In very competitive and very monopolistic markets only the gambling 
equilibrium exists, but in intermediate markets both types of equilibria are possible. Repullo 
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(2002, p. 21) considers capital requirements and deposit ceilings as regulation alternatives and 
suggests that “the former are always effective, while the latter may not always work”. Koehn 
and Santomero (1980) examine the effect of capital requirements on the riskiness of the asset 
portfolio chosen by an individual bank. They set up a maximization problem, in which banks 
find an optimal fraction of equity to risky investment. The social planner then introduces flat 
capital requirements in order to “lower probability of failure” (Koehn, Santomero, 1980, p. 
1243). The authors show that depending on how risk averse an individual bank is, some banks 
may increase the amount of risky investments. This produces perverse effects in the model, 
since under certain conditions “the relatively safe banks become safer, while risky institutions 
increase their risk position” (ibid.). Santomero and Watson (1977) point out that capital 
regulation may involve a tradeoff between “the marginal social benefit of reducing the risk of 
the negative externalities from bank failures and the marginal social cost of diminishing 
intermediation” (Herring et al., 1995, p. 22).  Blum (1999) treats the effect of capital on 
assets in a dynamic setting where banks are allowed to make investments in the first two 
periods. Depending on whether capital regulation is introduced in the second or the third time 
period, this has an effect on the asset composition. Specifically, introduction of capital 
requirements in the third (and the last) period leads to “an increase in risk” (Blum, 1999, p. 
755). Gorton and Winton (1995) propose a multi-period model of banking that is solved 
through backward induction. The aggregate risk in the model presents itself as a sudden event 
and its overall level becomes known, “even though which individual banks have losses is not 
known” (Gorton, Winton, 1995, p. 8) until some further date. Banks may restructure their 
portfolios in response to this information. The paper seeks to outline optimal capital 
requirements “with the aim of reducing the chance of an individual bank failure and thus 
enhancing the overall stability of the overall banking system” (ibid., p. 1). The authors come 
to a conclusion that not all banks may adhere to the rules, but under certain conditions the 
“regulator may find it optimal to pursue policies that resemble “forbearance” – i.e. the 
regulator does not close banks that have a low or negative net worth” (ibid., p. 3). Moreover, 
the paper shows that raising additional capital inflicts costs on other parts of the economy, and 
“these costs may lead the regulator to set a capital standard lower than that called by 
stability considerations alone” (Santos, 2000, p. 14). A paper by Kashyap et al. (2010) 
examines the cost effect of raising capital requirements through analyzing existing empirical 
evidence. The authors conclude that in the short-run increased capital requirements will “lead 
to a contractionary effect on the lending activity” (Kashyap et al., 2010, p. 2), because banks 
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will choose to adjust through decreasing their assets rather than increasing equity. In the long-
run, however, the paper argues on the basis of the Modigliani-Miller theorem that even 
significant increases in capital requirement will lead only to small changes in “the borrowing 
costs faced by banks’ customers” (ibid.). Hence, it is competition in the financial sector and 
not equity cost that makes banks take up more risk.    
Another strand of literature on financial stability suggests that the main source of 
systemic risk may be financial interconnectedness. Acemoglu et al. (2003, p. 24) examine 
“the relationship between the structure of the financial network and systemic risk”. The 
authors distinguish between complete and incomplete structures and argue that financial 
stability may be secured by different structures depending on the number of idiosyncratic 
shocks. Specifically, if the number of “negative shocks is below a critical threshold, a more 
equal distribution of interbank obligations leads to less fragility” (ibid., p. 24). For a large 
number of negative shocks the opposite is true, according to the paper. The authors argue that 
there exists “financial network externality” (ibid., p. 25), when banks “do not take into 
account the fact that their lending decisions may also put many other banks … at a greater 
risk of default” (ibid.). A similar model proposed by Allen and Gale focuses on “contagion 
through interlinkages” (2007, p. 261) and distinguishes between complete and incomplete 
structures in a similar manner. The authors conclude that the incomplete structure of financial 
network “promotes possibility of contagion” (ibid., p. 282), while the complete structure “has 
equilibria with and without contagion and provides a weaker case for the likelihood of 
contagion” (ibid.). 
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3 The Basel Accords 
Regulation of the financial system has a long history. In fact, “production of (private) money 
has always been taxed, the seigniorage or monopoly premium on coins being the property of 
the government” (Rochet, Freixas, 2008, p. 305). In the recent years various rules for financial 
institutions have become so numerous and extensive that banking has been called “one of the 
most regulated industries in the world” (Santos, 2000, p. 1). One of the reasons for that is a 
sudden increase in the incidence of financial crises often linked to preceding liberalization of 
the financial sector. Until the early 1970s banks were seen as “akin to public utilities, not 
commercial entities – boring, uninnovative, but safe” (Goodhart et al., 2004, p. 594). The 
onset of liberalization gave rise to several booms in the industry, but ended each time in a 
subsequent bust. The first global attempt to increase soundness of the financial system started 
with the establishment of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the 
conclusion of 1988 Basel Accord on capital standards later extended to Basel II and Basel III 
regulation requirements. The Accords were concluded and function on a purely voluntary 
basis representing soft law. However, “if a country refused to abide by the Accords of the 
BCBS, the banks of that country could have their branches, and/or subsidiaries, banned from 
operating in the main financial centers” (ibid., p. 596). 
The primary goal of the first Basel agreement was harmonization of capital standards 
in response to “concern about international banks’ financial health … and complaints of 
unfair competition” (Santos, 2000, p. 17). Targeting the liabilities was considered important 
for “maintaining solvency of the regulated institution” (Morris, Shin, 2008, p. 230). Capital 
was categorized into two elements: Tier 1 and Tier 2. The former consisted of equity and 
disclosed reserves, while the latter could, for instance, include hybrid debt capital. Later 
amendment to the first Basel Accord defined Tier 3 capital that allowed use of subordinated 
debt. With the capital definition in place the framework required that “the target standard 
ratio of capital to risk weighted assets should be set at 8%” (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision [BCBS], 1988, p. 14) for banks with an international presence. Four different risk 
weights, also called buckets, were designed and attached to on-balance sheet assets, while 
“off-balance sheet contingent contracts, such as letter of credit, loan commitments and 
derivative instruments … needed to be first converted to a credit equivalent and then 
multiplied by the appropriate risk weight” (Santos, 2000, p. 17). This became known as the 
Standardized approach criticized immediately for “treating all banks alike and not giving 
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safer banks the incentive to distinguish themselves from riskier ones in order to save on 
capital” (ibid., p. 19). The Accord was amended in 1996 allowing banks to use their internal 
models to determine required capital needed to cover risks and estimate the individual 
probability of default. Even though it was observed that “the introduction of Basel I was 
followed by an increase in capital ratios” (Jablecki, 2009, p. 20), this proved to be 
insufficient in order to guarantee financial stability.  
The search for mechanisms that would improve banks’ risk management and secure 
truthful revelation of risks led to a proposal to revise the original Basel Accord. This 
prompted an introduction of the Basel II framework based on three pillars: minimum capital 
standards, a supervisory review process and effective use of market discipline (BCBS, 2006). 
The first pillar aimed at “making capital charges more correlated with the credit risk of the 
bank’s asset” (Santos, 2000, p. 21). To this end a new Internal Ratings-Based Approach 
(IRBA) was introduced allowing banks to estimate their own probability of default that could 
be converted to minimum capital requirements. The underlying idea was that “banks have 
better information regarding their own risks and returns than the regulator does” (Rochet, 
Freixas, 2008, p. 323). Thus, Basel II permitted banks “a choice between two broad 
methodologies for calculating their capital requirements for credit risk” (BCBS, 2006, p. 19): 
a somewhat modified Standardized approach or the IRBA. The second pillar consisted of 
monitoring process in order to “ensure that a bank’s capital position is consistent with its 
overall risk profile and enable early intervention” (Santos, 2000, p. 21). Its goal was to 
prevent capital from falling below some minimum level. Finally, the third pillar sought to 
“encourage market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements” (BCBS, 2006, 
p. 226) allowing “market participants to assess key pieces of information on the scope of 
application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence the capital 
adequacy of the institution” (ibid.). With such information publicly available market 
participants were encouraged to influence banks’ risk management in a manner of a natural 
regulation mechanism. However, also these requirements proved to be insufficient: “many 
institutions had equity amounting to 1-3% of their balance sheets even as they were vaunting 
themselves as having 10% “core capital” (Hellwig, 2010, p. 3), and various sorts of 
adjustments became widespread.  
Recognition of the shortcomings of the Basel II framework in the aftermath of the 
latest financial crisis led to a new revision process and the introduction of the Basel III 
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regulatory standard aimed at extension of previous requirements. Insuffiency of existing 
capital buffers was ascribed to “various deficiencies of risk models and risk management” 
(Hellwig, 2010, p. 5). Several new mechanisms were proposed as a strategy of improving 
matters. To begin with, the new framework launches harmonization of the definition of 
capital specifying explicitly types of capital allowed in the two Tiers and abolishing the 
concept of Tier 3. The new capital requirements raise the amount of common equity in the 
previous risk-weighted requirements and introduce additional buffers, such as “capital 
conservation buffer”, ensuring “build-up of adequate buffers above the minimum that can be 
drawn down in periods of stress” (BCBS, 2011, p. 6). As an additional measure against 
insufficiency of bank capital the Basel III framework introduces the concept of the “leverage 
ratio”, defined as the proportion of Tier 1 capital to total consolidated assets, and set at the 3% 
level. Moreover, the new regulatory standard addresses the issue of procyclicality underlining 
that “one of the most destabilizing elements of the crisis has been the procyclical 
amplification of financial shocks throughout the banking system, financial markets and 
broader economy” (ibid., p. 5). This is dealt with through introduction of counter-cyclical 
capital buffers that can “achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking 
sector in periods of excess aggregate credit growth” (ibid., p. 7). Finally, one of the biggest 
innovations in the new regulatory framework has been regulation of liquidity through the 
“liquidity coverage ratio” and the “net stable funding ratio”. The former ensures that every 
financial institution has “sufficient high-quality liquid assets to survive a significant stress 
scenario lasting for one month” (BCBS, 2013, p. 1), while the latter seeks to “provide a 
sustainable maturity structure of assets and liabilities” (ibid.). Liquidity dry-up has been 
pointed out as a decisive factor in the unraveling of the latest financial crisis. The two 
regulation mechanisms aim at preventing situations of bank runs where illiquid banks may 
become insolvent due to liquidity shortages. Thus, the new liquidity requirements may reflect 
the idea that “the traditional approach to financial regulation, based on institutional solvency 
and identifying solvency with equity capital, has come up short in its assigned task of 
ensuring system stability” (Morris, Shin, 2008, p. 230).  
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4 Model 
4.1 Assumptions 
Suppose that a bank can invest a fraction of its assets in either a safe liquid asset that, for 
instance, could correspond to government bonds or a risky illiquid asset u that could 
correspond to mortgages issued to private persons and enterprises. For simplicity it is 
assumed that only the risky asset generates a positive return, while the return on the safe 
investment is 0. Banks differ in their ability to handle risk, which is represented by the 
parameter θ. The latter follows some distribution with the probability density function f (θ) on 
the interval [0, 1]. Banks with θ = 0 are assumed to be bad at handling risk, while the opposite 
is the case for banks with θ = 1. Intuitively, θ could represent the quality of portfolio 
management, such as degree of diversification, how much time or effort is invested in 
monitoring loans or general ability to assess risks, i.e. human factor. Since any bank is a 
financial intermediary, the money for investments must come from the bank’s liabilities: in 
this model the choice is between equity (capital), k, and demand deposits, (1-k). It may seem 
that such liability structure represents an oversimplification and the existence of other types of 
capital has been central in discussions of financial stability. However, for emerging market 
economies “common equity has always been the major component of capital” (IMF, 2012, p. 
92), so it may not obscure reality so much after all. It is assumed that there are unlimited 
borrowing possibilities in the population, so a bank can borrow any amount of money and 
invest in productive alternatives.  
On its liabilities each bank is obliged to pay some gross promised return. For 
simplicity only the gross promised return on equity is regarded as positive making equity a 
more expensive borrowing alternative. For illustration the bank’s profit function could be 
written as       , where u stands for the fraction of risky assets in the total assets. All banks 
are assumed to be of equal size with assets and liabilities summing up to 1, so u and k can 
thus be regarded both as fractions and as absolute amounts of risky investments and capital. 
The profit function is assumed to be increasing in the amount of risky investment, but 
decreasing in the amount of capital:   
         and   
        . The latter assumption 
implies that the Modigliani-Miller theorem doesn’t hold. The profit function is concave in 
u:    
         . Decreasing returns on u could be due to the fact that by issuing mortgages 
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continuously a bank would eventually have to go “down the list”: issue loans to less and less 
responsible customers, which in turn affects the revenues. The effect of capital on profit is 
assumed to be linear,     
         , which will be justified below. Increasing capital is 
assumed to have no effect on the marginal profit from the risky investment:    
         .  
It is assumed that there might exist some market discipline or “market capital 
requirements”. As noted by, for instance, Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995) some factors, 
such as costs of financial distress, make creditors demand higher interest rates. “In response, 
shareholders may choose to reduce these expected costs by increasing capital ratio of the 
bank” (Berger et al., 1995, p. 6). A similar idea has been expressed by Piti Disyatat (2010, p. 
716) who states that “a bank can issue credit up to a certain multiple of its own capital, which 
is dictated either by regulation or by market discipline”. The assumption about the existence 
of market capital requirements stands thus in contrast to a popular idea that “depositors are 
not in a position to control the bank’s activities (or to bargain with the owners)” (Rochet, 
Freixas, 2008, p. 309). In line with this assumption the fraction of capital is assumed to be a 
weakly increasing and concave function of risky investments:   
       and    
       . 
The promised return on the capital and demand deposits is thus held fixed in the present 
model allowing the amount of capital to adjust. With “market capital requirements” the profit 
function may be formalized as          . 
Aggregate investment in risky assets is assumed to generate systemic risk with a 
potential cost for the economy in case of collapse, c(X), where X stands for the total sum of 
risky investments across all banks. It is assumed that the financial system can tolerate some 
certain level of X treated as a stochastic variable with a certain threshold, beyond which there 
is significant probability of an economic turmoil. Each bank takes the aggregate risk as given 
and is only able to estimate its individual probability of going bankrupt       . The latter 
increases in the amount of risky alternative,    
        , but decreases in the amount of 
capital, which acts as a “buffer against unexpected losses” (Hellwig 2010: 9),   
        . 
Finally, it is assumed that the function of the individual probability of going bankrupt is 
convex in u and k:    
          and    
         . The cross-derivative of this function is 
assumed to be negative: increasing capital with one more unit decreases the marginal 
probability of going bankrupt through one additional unit of investment in the risky asset: 
   
         . Each bank takes into consideration the possibility of facing systemic collapse 
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modeled as           . With “market capital requirements” the function for the individual 
probability of going bankrupt becomes          . 
Both the profit function        and the individual probability of going bankrupt 
       are assumed to be functions of θ. Banks with better risk handling ability generate 
higher revenues from a given amount of risky investment:    
          . At the same time 
the marginal probability of going bankrupt decreases in θ,    
         , and the effect of an 
additional unit of capital has a stronger effect on the probability of going bankrupt for banks 
with high values of θ:    
         .  
4.2 A simple illustration 
The following model treats the financial system as an aggregation of banks making 
investment and funding decisions separately from each other and not being connected by the 
interbank market. The starting point of the model is the net present value (NPV) of a bank, 
which could be formalized the following way: 
 
                                                  
 
The assumptions of the model could be illustrated graphically:  
Figure 1. Revenues from risky investments for different θ’s. 
   
The fraction of risky investment, u, is depicted on the x-axis and a bank’s revenues from u are 
depicted on the y-axis. Higher θ contributes to higher revenues for each level of u.  
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The effect of k on the profit function  (      ) stems from the assumption that the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem doesn’t hold, which in turn implies that increasing capital fraction 
increases banks’ total funding costs. Some empirical support of this can be found, for 
instance, in a paper by Bent Vale, who suggests that “an increase in bank’s equity ratio … 
will increase funding costs by an interval ranging from 11 bps to 41 bps” (Vale, 2011, p. 13). 
However, this argument by itself doesn’t imply the assumed linearity of the cost function. 
According to Vale, raising new capital may be associated with the “lemon problem”: “firms 
with the strongest incentive to issue new shares in the market are those firms, which are 
currently overvalued” (ibid., p. 12). This will create difficulties with raising new equity and 
may, perhaps, suggest a convex cost of capital. At the same time “when regulators require all 
banks to raise their equity ratio within a short horizon, issuing new equity in the market may 
not be a significant negative signal about the true value of the individual bank” (ibid., p. 13). 
Since the present thesis focuses on financial regulation, the latter argument is adopted and the 
capital cost function is thus assumed to be linear:    
  (      )   .  
Figure 2. Individual probability of going bankrupt,       , for different θ’s. 
  
The fraction of risky investment, u, is depicted on the x-axis. Higher θ contributes to lower 
probability of going bankrupt for each level of u. 
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Figure 3. Individual probability of going bankrupt,       , for different θ’s. 
 
The fraction of capital, k, is depicted on the x-axis. Higher θ contributes to lower probability 
of going bankrupt for each level of k. 
Assuming an interior solution and since the profit function is concave in u and the function of 
the individual probability of going bankrupt is convex in u, the NPV function will be concave 
and for a given θ have its maximum at: 
 
  
    
   
     
    
   
          
  
This is a standard externality problem, which, in line with Perotti and Suarez (2011, p. 4), 
shows that “even if an individual bank’s funding decision takes into account its own exposure 
to refinancing risk, it will not internalize its systemwide effect”. Since banks treat the 
aggregate cost of systemic collapse as given, they naturally opt for too much risky investment 
in their asset portfolios. The presence of market capital requirements both reduces the 
marginal cost and marginal profit and the total effect depends on the strength of the two. So 
the market may potentially partially correct the existing externality. 
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5 Regulation under perfect 
information 
5.1 Regulation of assets 
Suppose the social planner has perfect information about the distribution of θ among 
individual banks and can estimate the upper limit of aggregate risk that the financial system 
can tolerate, X, precisely. Since risky assets in the model represent mortgages, continuous 
lending leading to systemic risk accumulation beyond X would mean potential “excessive rise 
in asset prices relative to fundamentals” (Haugland, Vikøren, 2006, p. 25). Beyond this level 
many customers may start having difficulties repaying the mortgages and many banks may 
face unexpectedly high losses finding themselves on the verge of going bankrupt. A wave of 
defaults could path way for pecuniary externalities leading to price fall, which could generate 
further defaults. At the same time even if only some banks go bankrupt, this could have 
further effects through, for instance, the interbank market not modeled in the thesis. It has 
been observed that “the rate of growth of bank lending to the private sector has, in the past, 
been a good predictor of financial crises” (Goodhart et al., 2004, p. 600).  
One obvious way to ensure stability in this situation is to introduce restrictions on u, 
the risk-generating illiquid asset, in order “to limit the scope of the bank’s ability to engage in 
moral-hazard behavior» (Hellmann et al., 2000, p. 150).  
This “isoperimetric problem” can be then formulated within the framework of control theory:  
   ∫ [                                           ]      
 
 
  
 ̇                              [   ]  
 
The Hamiltonian can be written as: 
           [ (      )               ]               
 
Under appropriate concavity and boundary assumptions and for each     [   ] an interior 
solution has to obey: 
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The function      satisfies the following equation: 
 ̇     
   
 ̇     
      , constant, determined endogenously.  
Since      measures the contribution to the value function that the social planner is 
maximizing if      was to increase with one more unit, it is reasonable to conjecture that 
       in this case.  
Note that from the first-order condition one can define           , which can be inserted 
into the integral constraint to become: 
  ∫               
 
 
  =>           
The condition for x is:  
 ̇             with        ,         
The condition for u becomes: 
  
    
    
   
     
    
   
             or 
  
    
   
        
        
   
     
 
The marginal benefit and marginal cost are equated. Unlike individual banks the social 
planner accounts for the cost of the systemic risk represented by D.  
 
Looking at the optimality condition again: 
  
    
    
   
     
    
   
            , with      . 
Differentiating the first order condition with respect to θ yields: 
   
   ̇       
    
  ̇       
       
   ̇       
    
  ̇       
     
     
   ̇     
  
    
   ̇       
    
  ̇       
             
   ̇       
    
  ̇       
     
  
   
   ̇     
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Collecting terms: 
   
      
    
     
    
     
     
      
    
           
      
    
     
    
     
     
    
  
    
    ̇         
      
    
     
          
    
       
 
Since    
    ,    
     and    
    : 
    
      
    
           
       
    
     
     
      
    
     ̇         
      
       
   
    
       
 
The right-hand side of the expression is always negative given the assumptions above. On the 
left-hand side all the terms have a negative sign, except for     
    
  and   
    
  . If k is weakly 
increasing in u,   
       , then both    and     are likely to be small. In addition to that, 
the cross effect,    
  , may be assumed to be weaker than the direct effects of    
   and    
  . 
This suggests that the amount of risky investment, u, must be an increasing function of θ.  
Figure 4. A possible illustration of the optimal path for       
 
θ is depicted on the x-axis. The authorities can control this path by changing the terminal 
condition for x,         .  
The illustration above shows that the social planner will allow banks with better risk 
handling ability to invest more in the risky asset. However, since the social planner accounts 
for the aggregate risk, it is reasonable to imply that banks will be restricted in their investment 
decisions compared to the unregulated equilibrium. Given that “market capital requirements” 
decrease the optimal amount of risky investments, their strength will determine how much the 
assets will have to be restricted compared to the unregulated equilibrium in order to secure 
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financial stability. Since   
       , banks with high θ and high u will also need to hold 
either the same or a larger fraction of capital as a result of market discipline. This suggests 
that      will be a weakly increasing function of θ. 
Suppose now that X is changed, set at a lower level X’. Then, since the aggregate risk 
is defined as  ∫           
 
 
 , the amount of u must decrease. So if X is lowered, then the 
path for      will also be lowered on the graph, but will still remain increasing, because 
different banks’ credit ability and the distribution of θ remain unchanged. Under perfect 
information, if X is set at a lower level, banks with low values of θ will not be allowed to 
operate. Graphically this implies the following shift: 
Figure 5. The effect of lowering the allowed level of aggregate risk. 
 
θ is depicted on the x-axis.  ̂    summing up to X’ is still an increasing function of θ.  
As noted above the “liquidity coverage ratio” from Basel III “requires banks to back 
their use of short-term funding with the holding of high-quality liquid assets” (Perotti, Suarez, 
2011, p. 25). Since the asset side consists of just two alternatives in this model, imposing a 
prescription on the amount of investment in the risky asset for each bank of type θ is the same 
as imposing a prescription on the amount of investment in the safe alternative. So the path for 
u found above could just as well be regarded as a liquidity requirement. If banks’ risk 
handling is perfect information, banks that are bad at risk handling would need to hold more 
liquidity reserves “that could be easily sold, presumably at no fire-sale loss, in case of a 
crisis” (ibid.) in order to create trust and attract customers.  
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At the same time regulation of the asset side insures against liquidity but not credit 
risk. Illiquid assets can give unexpectedly low returns for each individual bank and losses 
would need to be covered with capital. Without any regulation of liabilities capital adjusts 
only through “market capital requirements” expressed by   
      . If   
      , the 
market has virtually no power on the banks. Without “market capital requirements” banks 
might still avoid investing everything in the risky alternative, because capital actually reduces 
the individual probability of going bankrupt. Without market power the adjustment equation 
becomes: 
 
   
         
                  
 
Differentiating the expression with respect to θ yields: 
   
   ̇       
       
   ̇       
             or 
    
          
    ̇         
      
        
 
It is now even more obvious that u is an increasing function of θ. The optimal capital fraction 
k for a given θ will be given by:  
                                      
  
    
       
Given the assumptions about the two functions, it is clear that if a marginal reduction in the 
expected cost of system collapse is less than a marginal reduction in the bank’s profit from 
increasing capital, the bank will have an incentive to reduce its capital. Since    
   < 0, banks 
that are bad at risk handling will have the biggest incentive of this kind. The individual 
probability of default,       , could thus correspond to Internal Ratings-Based Approach 
used to assess credit risks. Without market discipline the amount of capital would be 
connected to the banks’ subjective estimates of the probability of going bankrupt. The high 
cost of capital might create an incentive to underestimate this probability, but even if it is 
estimated correctly, capital ratios will still not be connected to the amount of risky assets. So 
capital buffers can be optimal only by chance and might not be able to cover banks’ losses in 
cases of idiosyncratic shocks.  
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5.2 Regulation of liabilities 
Suppose the social planner considers “market capital requirements” to be insufficient and 
wants to ensure stability of the system by regulating banks’ liabilities. One idea could be to tie 
the amount of capital to the bank’s overall assets. Since in this model k stands for the fraction 
of capital in the total liabilities and both assets and liabilities are equal to 1, this type of 
regulation could be modeled by simply making k exogenous in the optimization problem. 
Assuming that the social planner knows the level, at which k should be fixed, insufficiency of 
“market capital requirements” will result in an increase of capital buffers. 
 
The social planner will then maximize: 
   ∫ [                           ]      
 
 
  
 ̇                              [   ]  
 
The Hamiltonian can be written as: 
           [                   ]             
The condition for u is then:  
  
    
          
                  
The function      satisfies the following equation: 
 ̇     
   
 ̇     
       , constant. 
Since      measures the contribution to the value function that the social planner is 
maximizing if      was to increase with one more unit, it is reasonable to conjecture that 
     is negative in this case.  
In the first-order condition, due to assumptions about cross-derivatives of the two functions, 
  
        will be unchanged, while   
        will now be lower than in the case with “market 
capital requirements”. For given θ an increase in u is needed to equate both sides of the 
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expression. Regulating liabilities in this manner seems to create “incentives for banks to 
allocate resources to higher-risk assets because the returns on those assets were not offset by 
a requirement to hold larger amounts of capital against them” (IMF, 2012, p. 116-117). 
However, since aggregate risk X is determined solely by accumulation of risky assets,  ̇  
        , an increase in u will not be allowed by the social planner, because the system will 
otherwise end up with the amount of aggregate risk higher than X. This suggests that the path 
for u should be left unchanged.   
In order to deal with the incentive to invest more into risky assets the social planner 
may conclude that “the key determinant of the size of the required capital buffer should be the 
riskiness of the bank’s assets” (Morris, Shin, 2008, p. 230). Assuming that the previously 
described regulation on assets is in place, risk-weighted capital requirements could be 
modeled as: 
 
 
   or        
Assuming that      is a control variable as well, the new maximization problem becomes: 
           [                   ]             
The solution for u is then: 
  
    
     
     
     
            
  
    
          
    
           , where D < 0 as previously. 
                          , which implies  
               for       
Inserting the latter result into the first equation gives: 
                  
Differentiating the two conditions with respect to θ: 
       ̇         (  ̇      ̇   )               ̇         (  ̇      ̇   )  
             
 
23 
 
       ̇         (  ̇      ̇   )        (      ̇         (  ̇      ̇   )  
     )       
Collecting terms: 
(                                 ) ̇                       ̇            
            
(                                 ) ̇                       ̇            
           
 
Using the fact that         ,         and    
     the first expression becomes 
 (                     ) ̇               ̇                or 
  ̇     
           ̇              
                     
  
          
                     
 ̇     
         
                     
 
 
Inserting the expression for  ̇    into the second expression: 
(                          ) 
          
                     
 ̇     
          
                     
  
           ̇                       
Collecting terms: 
                                      
                     
 ̇     
                                      
                 
 
           ̇                       
The final result is thus: 
 
     ( 
  
    
  
        
  
       )
         
    
  
       ̇    
                 
                                  
         
   
The signs of the left-hand side and the right-hand side are ambiguous. In order to arrive to 
formal conclusions, it will be assumed that the effect of the cross-derivative,    
  , is weaker 
than the direct effects,    
   and    
  .   
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For simplicity    
   is set at 0: 
     ( 
  
    
  
      )
       
  ̇                     
                       
       
   
From this expression it is clear that the left-hand side of the equation is positive, while the 
right-hand side is ambiguous. If θ is characterized by sufficient variation in profit functions 
and probabilities of going bankrupt, so that the effect of  –        
  
  
      dominates, 
then optimal α will be a decreasing function of θ. In other words, if a marginal increase in θ 
increases the revenues from u and/or decreases the probability of going bankrupt from 
investing in u sufficiently much, then optimal capital requirements will be decreasing in θ. On 
the other hand, if the effect of risky investment on the profit function and the individual 
probability of going bankrupt do not differ much across banks, flat or even increasing capital 
requirements could be optimal. In the following sufficient variation in θ with respect to profit 
functions and probabilities of going bankrupt is assumed. Intuitively, banks that are good at 
handling risk do not need the same amount of such type of buffer for the risky investments as 
do banks that are bad at handling risk. This is in line with the general idea in the theoretical 
literature on capital regulation stressing that “required equity is greatest for the riskiest 
borrowers” (Coulter et al., 2013, p. 6). However, since α was originally defined as the ratio of 
capital to risky investment, the fact that  ̇      doesn’t imply anything about the absolute 
amount of capital for different banks: the latter could still be growing in θ together with the 
amount of risky investments. 
Figure 6. The optimal path of risk-weighted capital requirements     . 
 
θ is drawn on the x-axis.   
Returning back to the condition for  ̇   :  
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 ̇     
           ̇      
  
      
                 
  
          
            
  
       
 ̇     
         
            
  
       
  
 
Since  ̇     , it is clear that  ̇    will once again be an increasing function of θ given the 
assumption about the weak effect of the cross-derivative    
  
 .  
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6 Regulation under asymmetric 
information 
The mechanisms illustrated above suggest a too rosy picture of the task faced by regulators. In 
a more realistic setting potential social planner would face several serious challenges. First of 
all, there is an estimation problem. In order to effectively regulate the asset side, the planner 
must know the amount of risk the system as a whole can tolerate represented by X, since this 
information is used to distribute risky assets among different types of banks. In reality 
authorities can only make estimates of the aggregate risk on the basis of growth rates of 
various assets and other financial indicators. In a recent report by Brunnermeier et al. (2009, 
p. 30) it is suggested that “financial authorities should be alerted when clear indicators of a 
bubble emerge, even if the bubble cannot be identified for certain”. Secondly, such 
parameters as the ability to handle risk θ, the impact of risky assets and capital on the profit 
function,   
       and   
      , and the impact of risky assets and capital on the individual 
probability of bankruptcy,   
       and   
      , are typically reported by banks themselves. 
If regulation is to be efficient, banks must then have an incentive to report such parameters 
truthfully. This represents a problem of private information.  
In order to illustrate banks’ incentives, consider the regulation pattern outlined above. 
It was suggested that u must be following an increasing path and capital must either be tied to 
the risky or overall assets. If the latter is the case, then the fraction of capital is fixed, and 
since all banks are of equal size in the model, the absolute amount of capital kept as a buffer 
is the same for all types θ. In this situation banks with high values of θ, being allowed to 
invest more in risky assets than banks with low values of θ, will generate higher revenues. 
The cost of capital will be the same for all banks. This suggests that banks with high values of 
θ will generate higher profits. Since the probability of going bankrupt,       , is increasing 
and convex in u and decreasing and convex in k, banks with low investments in u will face 
only a small marginal increase in        if they increase risky investments. This creates an 
incentive for banks with low values of θ to pretend that they are better at risk handling than 
they are in reality if information about true θ is private.  
The second case is a bit more challenging. If the regulator chooses to assign an 
increasing path for u and tie capital to risky assets, then the optimal ratio of capital to risky 
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assets is decreasing in θ,  ̇     . Here a potential ambiguity arises, since banks with high 
values of θ have lower α, but larger investments in risky assets, so it is uncertain if they 
actually have more capital in absolute value compared to banks with low values of θ. Suppose 
that decreasing α means that banks with high values of θ hold less capital in absolute value 
than banks with low values of θ. Then by mimicking higher θ than what is the case in reality 
banks with low values of θ will face a possibility of increasing u and decreasing k. If they 
have relatively low investments in u and high capital buffers k to begin with, then marginal 
increase in u and decrease in k will produce a large positive effect on the NPV due to 
concavity of the profit function and a small negative effect on the individual probability of 
going bankrupt due to convexity of        in both variables. This will create an incentive for 
banks with low values of θ to pretend they are better at risk handling. Suppose that decreasing 
α means that banks with high values of θ hold the same amount capital in absolute value as 
banks with low values of θ. Again, this suggests that banks with low values of θ will have 
incentives to pretend they are better at risk handling than they actually are. Finally, if 
decreasing α means that banks with high values of θ hold more capital in absolute value than 
banks with low values of θ, then different scenarios are possible, and the conclusions will 
depend on the assumptions about the profit function, capital costs and effects of θ on the two 
functions. What is important, however, is that as long some banks receive larger profits, other 
banks would like to mimic them.  
Suppose the social planner wants to find an optimal combination of the regulation 
mechanisms outlined above given informational asymmetry. Once again the NPV function of 
a single bank is given by: 
                                   
 
If the social planner chooses to fix k, then, as mentioned above, banks with low values of θ 
and low prescribed investments in u may be willing to mimic banks with higher values of θ. 
This effect will actually be reinforced if   
       is underestimated through IRBA-modeling. 
Banks with high values of θ will also face an incentive to increase u due to concavity of the 
profit function and fixed cost of capital, but at the same time may experience a larger increase 
in the individual probability of going bankrupt. The situation for such banks is thus 
ambiguous. If banks with high values of θ do not change their investment strategy and since 
the aggregation of risky assets generates systemic risk in the model, the level of X is likely to 
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surpass the critical threshold. The social planner would then need to allow for less steep or 
even flat path of u, allowing banks with different values of θ to invest more or less the same 
in u. This will naturally result in ineffective risk-sharing: banks with high values of θ will 
have too big capital buffers as a proportion of risky assets or, alternatively, banks with low 
values of θ will have too small capital buffers. If k is set high enough, then banks with low 
values of θ may still have capital buffers that will prevent them from going bankrupt in a 
situation of crisis, but banks with high values of θ will end up with too much capital and 
suboptimal amount of risky investment. Moreover, since banks with low values of θ invest 
more in the risky assets than what is prescribed by the social planner, such banks will also end 
up with suboptimal liquidity buffers. If a large enough aggregate shock occurs, the system 
will need to rely on the interbank market or some sort of Lender of Last Resort, the Central 
Bank.  
Alternatively, if the social planner chooses to combine regulation of assets with risk-
weighted capital requirements under asymmetric information, different scenarios are possible. 
The crucial assumption here is what  ̇       means for the absolute amount of capital. 
Recall that        , and  ̇     . Decreasing α is thus compatible with decreasing, 
unchanged and increasing k. However, as pointed out previously, both decreasing and 
unchanged k lead to a situation where it may become attractive for less capable banks to 
mimic banks that are better at risk-handling, which will consequently pose a threat to 
financial stability. Consider therefore the case where the social planner imposes  ̇      as 
a capital requirement, which still means that k is growing in α. The cost of capital is linear, 
while the profit function is concave in u. This generates an ambiguous situation. For 
simplicity an illustration of what better risk handling implies for the profit function is 
provided. 
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Figure 7. The effect of higher θ on optimal choice of the amount of risky investment. 
 
The fraction of risky investments, u, is depicted on the x-axis, while revenues from u and the 
cost of capital k are on the y-axis.  
Profit considerations may deter banks with low values of θ from mimicking those with 
higher values of θ, simply because increasing risky investment given their risk handling may 
produce suboptimal or even negative NPV. This is because the cost of capital grows faster 
than the revenues from u. Since the individual probability of going bankrupt is increasing and 
convex in u and decreasing and convex in k, increasing both capital and the fraction of risky 
investments will at some point add negatively to the NPV. Banks will prefer the level of u 
corresponding to the biggest wedge between the revenues from u and the cost of capital k 
corresponding to maximum profit. However, if a bank with low value of θ is only allowed to 
make a small investment in u that it itself regards as suboptimal, then such bank will have an 
incentive to mimic banks with better risk handling both because marginal profit would exceed 
marginal cost of capital and because with very low investment in u increasing both risky 
investments and capital decreases the individual probability of going bankrupt. In other 
words, for low levels of investment in u, increasing both u and k is likely to contribute 
positively to the NPV through the individual probability of going bankrupt. The question is 
then, which level of u the bank will regard as optimal. Obviously, it must be the amount of 
investment corresponding to the unregulated equilibrium. As it has been pointed out before, 
regulation of assets entails lower investments in risky assets than under unregulated 
equilibrium especially for banks with low values of θ.  
In order to secure an increasing path of risky investments and decreasing path of 
capital requirements, the social planner should opt for a high value of α for banks that are bad 
at risk handling and for a low value of α for banks that are good at risk handling. A high value 
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of α implies that cost of capital must be growing fast if u increases and the opposite is the 
case for a low value of α. Graphically this can be illustrated the following way: 
Figure 8. Capital requirements for banks that are good at risk handling (low α). 
 
The fraction of risky investment, u, is depicted on the x-axis and the revenues from u and the 
cost of capital k are depicted on the y-axis.  
Figure 9. Capital requirements for banks that are bad at handling risk (high α). 
 
The fraction of risky investment, u, is depicted on the x-axis and the revenues from u and the 
cost of capital k are depicted on the y-axis. The revenues from u for banks that are bad at risk 
handling are more concave in u. 
However, imposing decreasing α will mean that the capital cost function is going to be steeper 
for banks with low values of θ. Banks that are bad at risk handling will then have an incentive 
to mimic banks that are good at risk handling. This can be illustrated with the following 
graph: 
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Figure 10. The effect of decreasing α on optimal adjustment of the amount of risky 
investment. 
 
The fraction of risky investment, u, is depicted on the x-axis, while both revenues from u and 
cost of capital are depicted on the y-axis.  
For given concavity of revenues, slacker capital cost function will correspond to a 
higher optimal level of u. So there will be stronger incentives for banks with low values of θ 
to mimic banks with higher values of θ. It should be noted that increasing both u and k for 
low initial values of both reduces the marginal probability of going bankrupt and contributes 
positively to the NPV. By mimicking better risk handling a bank with some low value of θ 
will then be able to increase its investment in risky assets and hold a smaller capital buffer as 
a fraction of those assets.  
The social planner can of course regulate the slope of the cost function by choosing a 
higher ratio for 
 
 
 and may thus consider imposing same α for all banks. This would ensure 
that k grows proportionally with u in θ, which would imply a faster growing k compared with 
the previous solution. Here, however, a new challenge arises, since it is assumed that the first-
best α must be a decreasing function of θ. Keeping α constant means that either banks with 
high values of θ will end up with a higher than optimal level of k or banks with low values of 
θ will end up with a lower than optimal level of k or both. Graphically this implies: 
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Figure 11. Alternative possibilities of setting capital requirements α. 
 
Θ is depicted on the x-axis. The optimal      found under perfect information is a decreasing 
function of θ. 
Choosing α at the same level for all banks means that it must be set either at the level 
of banks that are good at risk handling, at the level of banks that are bad at risk handling or at 
some intermediate level. Suppose the social planner sets α at the level, which is optimal for 
banks with high values of θ. This will once again imply a slack capital cost function. This is 
likely to produce incentives to mimic banks with better ability for risk-handling and invest 
more in u. This will result in both liquidity risk, since liquidity buffers will decrease, and 
credit risk. Obviously, the same will hold for the intermediate case as well.  
Setting α at the level, which is optimal for banks with low values of θ, will make 
banks with high values of θ “hold an inefficiently high amount of capital” (Hellmann et al., 
2000, p. 148). Since the profit function is concave in u and the cost of capital is linear, this 
will most likely produce suboptimal profits for the banks with high values of θ and in addition 
may add to their perceived risk of going bankrupt, since        is increasing and convex in u 
and decreasing and convex in k. Banks with low values of θ will now have weaker incentives 
to mimic those with high values of θ, because increasing investments in u will produce an 
increase in revenue that is less than increase in cost. However, banks with high values of θ 
may acquire an incentive to reduce their investments in u in order to decrease the linear cost 
of capital and the probability of going bankrupt. This will not threaten financial stability, 
since the latter is directly connected to the aggregate investment in u, but will decrease the 
aggregate investment in risky assets. This may be illustrated with the graph used above: 
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Figure 12. The effect of stricter capital requirements on optimal adjustment of the 
amount of risky investment. 
 
The amount of risky investment, u, is depicted on the x-axis and the revenues from u and the 
cost of capital k are depicted on the y-axis.  
Given the ability to handle risk and the slope of capital cost, the banks will adjust in 
order to maximize their profits, which will lead to reduction in investment in u for banks with 
higher values of θ. Since u was initially distributed in such a way that the overall investment 
in u summed up to the maximum amount of risk the system can tolerate, X, decrease in u 
would lead to a decrease in the aggregate risk X. At the same time since the individual 
probability of going bankrupt        is convex in u and k, banks with high values of θ will 
have the strongest incentive of all banks to decrease their investments in u, since they have 
the largest fractions of risky investments and capital among banks and that is likely to 
contribute negatively to their NPV through       .  
Thus, if the social planner wants to insure against credit risk, (s)he should set α at the 
level, which is optimal for the banks with lowest values of θ. If, however, the main goal is to 
make the aggregate risk be equal to X, (s)he should opt for some intermediate solution: setting 
capital requirements, α, at a level that is somewhat below what is optimal for banks with the 
lowest values of θ. In that situation the worst banks will invest somewhat more in u than what 
is optimal for them, the best banks will invest somewhat less and the aggregate risk will sum 
up to X.  
It is possible to find the optimal constant α mathematically. Suppose α is now treated 
as constant in the optimization problem: 
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            [                   ]            
For each     [   ] the solution for u is then: 
  
    
     
     
     
            
  
    
          
    
           , where D < 0 as previously. 
From the first-order condition for u, we can define               , which can be inserted 
into the integral constraint to become: 
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Suppose that both α and X can be chosen by the regulator. Let then        be the value 
function of the problem above that was solved for fixed α and X. For α and X to be optimal we 
have         ,           and         ,          . Suppose that D is independent 
of type: 
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This demonstrates that overall investment in u will be lower if regulated by the social planner 
compared to the market equilibrium. Moreover, the result above defines the optimal level of 
X.  
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Similarly, the result above defines an optimal α. Since the value function depends both on α 
and X, optimality in this case suggests that there should be cost efficiency: the two marginal 
costs above should be equal.  
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Finally, it might be interesting to consider what may happen if the social planner decides to 
lower the level of X under asymmetric information. As mentioned before, this will imply the 
following shift: 
Figure 13. The effect of lowering the allowed level of aggregate risk. 
 
θ is depicted on the x-axis.  ̂    summing up to X’ is still an increasing function of θ. 
Under this scenario banks with low values of θ that are bad at risk handling will not be 
allowed to invest anything in the risky asset. However, since banks’ profit functions remain 
unchanged and given that risk-weighted capital requirements or the leverage ratio remain the 
same, banks will have a strong incentive to pretend that they are better at risk handling and 
invest the same amount in u as before in order not to lose on profits. This suggests that the 
number of banks operating may not be reduced and since the aggregate risk is defined as the 
sum of total investment in the risky asset, the critical level of X’ is likely to be surpassed. 
Moreover, the new liquidity buffers will not be adhered to. It seems that this type of 
regulation is not an effective mechanism in this case in line with the argument by von 
Thadden (2011, p. 47), who states that “regulation in practice … does not necessarily aim at 
the asset side, but rather tries to make sure that assets are funded by a more resilient liability 
structure”.  
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7 Discussion 
Several important topics within the field of financial regulation deserve a discussion based on 
the theoretical model above. The first-best solution based on some of the described regulation 
mechanisms may guarantee financial stability under perfect information and secure in 
addition efficient risk sharing, optimal liquidity and capital buffers. It has been pointed out 
that “liquidity risk and solvency risk are hardly separable” (Perotti, Suarez, 2011, p. 4), but 
the discussion will nevertheless distinguish between the two concepts referring to the amounts 
of safe asset and capital respectively. The outlined model shows that under asymmetric 
information the first-best solution is unobtainable and certain tradeoffs are inevitable. What is 
important, however, is to what extent predictions of the model actually match currently 
observed empirical trends.  
7.1 Predictions of the model 
As demonstrated above, given informational asymmetry a combination of liquidity regulation 
together with capital requirements may guarantee financial stability given that the latter are 
set at a sufficiently high level. Of this reason the funding structure of financial institutions has 
been suggested to be of primary importance: “banks … that carry less leverage are less likely 
to experience distress” (IMF, 2013, p. 132). However, since efficient risk sharing and optimal 
liquidity and capital buffers matter as well, it might still be “impossible to implement any 
Pareto-efficient outcome using just capital requirements as the tool of prudential regulation” 
(Hellmann et al., 2000, p. 148). 
To begin with, “market capital requirements”, if strong enough, may contribute to 
financial stability and more efficient risk sharing. Banks that invest more in the risky 
alternative will have to hold more capital in absolute amount. Intuitively, “capital serves as a 
signaling mechanism to alleviate informational asymmetries between banks and their 
creditors” (Disyatat, 2010, p. 727). Depending on the strength of these requirements different 
outcomes are possible. Since banks that are good at risk handling are able to generate higher 
profits for each amount of risky investment, they will naturally be able to pay a higher cost of 
capital. However, since the market does not take the banks’ ability to handle risk into 
consideration directly, the optimality conditions can only be achieved by chance. In theory, 
this type of self-correcting mechanism may be compatible with the first-best arrangement 
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found under perfect information: increasing path of risky investments and decreasing path of 
risk-weighted capital requirements. However, there is nothing about this mechanism that 
guarantees that the critical level of aggregate risk will not be surpassed and that both capital 
and liquidity buffers will be optimal. Since market requirements function through some sort 
of collective force, it is likely that optimality will be difficult to achieve due to problems of 
coordination.   
The second regulation alternative considered in the model above assigns an increasing 
path for risky investments, but fixes capital requirements at the same level for all banks. As 
mentioned before, this creates mimicking incentives, because with fixed cost of capital the 
only factor that can stop banks from investing more in the risky alternative is accelerating 
individual probability of going bankrupt that adds negatively to their NPV. Due to convexity 
of that function banks that are prescribed low levels of risky investments by the social planner 
will be the first in line to mimic better risk handling ability and increase the amount of risky 
assets. This is going to deteriorate both financial stability and efficient risk sharing. The social 
planner may want to prevent systemic crisis by making the path of risky investments flatter in 
the risk-handling ability. This may secure financial stability by holding the sum of aggregate 
risk below the critical level, but risk sharing inefficiency will not be improved on. If capital 
buffers are set high enough, the social planner may eliminate credit risk, but liquidity risk will 
remain an issue, because banks that are bad at risk handling will have incentives to 
“compensate the loss in utility from the reduction in leverage with the choice of a riskier 
portfolio” (Berger et al., 1995, p. 12) and will consequently end up with low liquidity buffers. 
A well-functioning interbank market or the Central Bank will then be needed in order to cope 
with the problem of liquidity shortage in cases of idiosyncratic shocks hitting banks that are 
bad at risk handling. Moreover, financial stability in this case will be achieved at the cost of 
large amounts of capital. This is somewhat similar to a proposal suggesting “funding banks 
with equity rather than demand deposits” (ibid., p. 7). If the path for risky investment is, for 
instance, flat, banks will invest the same in the risky alternative regardless of their risk 
handling ability. Since the aggregate risk must sum up to some predefined value and the path 
of risky investments is now flat instead of increasing, banks that are bad at handling risk will 
be able to invest more in the risky alternative than under the first-best solution. In this 
situation, if credit risk is to be eliminated, the social planner must opt for capital buffers that 
would be enough to cover losses of banks that are bad at handling risk. This means naturally 
that banks that are good at risk handling will have too high capital buffers. As pointed out by 
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Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995, p. 22), if the Modigliani-Miller “proposition applied to 
banks this would be a costless solution”, but, as mentioned above, empirical research has 
pointed at contradicting evidence.  
The final regulation alternative considered in the model prescribes an increasing path 
for risky investments and same risk-weighted capital requirements for all banks, defined as a 
ratio of capital to risky investments. As described above, “the regulator is informationally 
constrained in targeting individual bank characteristics” (Perotti, Suarez, 2011, p. 4), so risk-
weighted capital requirements that are decreasing in risk-handling ability turn out suboptimal 
due to same mimicking incentives. Moreover, the social planner realizes that financial 
stability may be achieved if the ratio of capital to risky investments is set high enough: a 
steeply increasing capital cost function in a combination with concave revenue function will 
under certain conditions deter banks that are bad at risk handling from increasing their risky 
investments. However, in this case two different scenarios are possible. On the one hand, the 
social planner may set capital requirements at the level that is optimal for the banks with the 
worst risk handling ability. This may secure financial stability, insure against credit and 
liquidity risks. However, banks that have the best ability to handle risk will under this 
scenario be likely to reduce their risky investments compared to the first-best solution. This 
may then lead to underinvestment. On the other hand, the social planner may opt for 
somewhat lower capital requirements in order to secure enough overall investment in the 
risky asset. As mentioned before, banks that are bad at handling risk will then be the first in 
line to increase their risky investments. This may still ensure financial stability in the sense 
that the overall investment in the risky alternative will be held below the predefined critical 
level, but will deteriorate efficient risk sharing and create credit and liquidity risks for the 
banks that are bad at risk handling. A well-functioning interbank market or the Central Bank 
may alleviate the problem of liquidity risk, but credit risk for banks with the worst risk-
handling ability will remain an issue. It has been argued that the latter is actually more 
dangerous than liquidity risk, because “if there is more equity and less debt on the balance 
sheet, liquidity concerns may not be as acute, because creditors have relatively fewer claims 
and the probability of insolvency is smaller” (Admati et al., 2011, p. 2). Nevertheless, since 
there are no interconnections between banks in the model, there will be no direct spread of 
risk to other parts of the system in cases of idiosyncratic shocks hitting banks that are bad at 
risk handling. If the latter actually go bankrupt, this might be regarded as efficient. Still it can 
be easily imagined that this can lead to other costs: banks “produce information about 
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borrowers which is lost if they fail or leave the industry” (Berger et al., 1995, p. 14). Also, 
since the majority of banks hold enough liquidity and more capital under this arrangement 
than what is optimal under the first-best scenario of perfect information, bank panics may not 
escalate beyond the least capable banks.  
Overall, the results suggest that with the regulation mechanisms above financial 
stability may only be achieved at the expense of large amounts of capital, efficient risk 
sharing, liquidity or credit risks. Such result is partly due to the fact that liabilities are 
regulated through what is known as bunching: in this case treating different abilities to handle 
risk through equal capital requirements. It is thus not surprising that the result is in line with 
the conjecture made by Perotti and Suarez (2011, p. 6), who argue that “banks with better 
credit opportunities will be constrained, while the reduced systemic risk actually encourages 
banks with low credit ability … to expand”. The problem arises due to the fact that existing 
regulation offers no mechanism to secure truthful revelation of incentives under asymmetric 
information, while market capital requirements are not comprehensive enough so that they 
can be relied on. Moreover, since described regulation mechanisms do not secure first-best 
efficiency, their implementation may create need for even more regulation. For instance, if 
liquidity risks are to be improved upon with the help of the Central Bank, this can create 
further problems, such as moral hazard.  
7.2 Current trends 
The new Basel III standards are currently under way to its implementation, so the exact effect 
of the regulation mechanisms they offer is uncertain. The adjustment to new requirements 
may be happening gradually: “banks have diverse funding patterns that change only slowly” 
(IMF, 2013, p. 132). However, some of the emerging trends have already been discussed both 
in the theoretical literature and in financial reports produced by policy makers. Given the 
results of the theoretical model above, it is thus interesting to consider the discussion about 
the extent, to which the new Basel Accord might be able to secure financial stability and the 
tradeoffs it might produce. 
To begin with, Basel III capital requirements “alter the risk weights assigned to 
various assets to better align them with the risk incurred” (IMF, 2012, p. 83). This has been 
done in response to the critique of the Basel II capital requirements being not attached to the 
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“right risks”. Reformulation of what constitutes risky assets means that their amount in banks’ 
balance sheets is likely to increase and with risk-weighted capital requirements in place it will 
be necessary to raise additional capital. This may improve banks’ capital buffers and decrease 
credit risk. Thinking in terms of the model above this may be beneficial for banks that are bad 
at risk handling, because by redefining risky assets such mechanism will increase the total 
cost of capital and decrease the incentive to invest more in the risky asset. However, it has 
been observed that “some distressed banks remain vulnerable because their equity capital 
levels are inadequate” (IMF, 2013, p. 105). This might indicate that banks that are bad at risk 
handling have been slow to adjust to the new regulation requirements. For banks that are good 
at risk handling or for banks with significant investments in risky assets such reformulation 
may create an incentive to reduce risky investments together with absolute amount of capital. 
A trend of this sort has been confirmed empirically: “early evidence suggests banks may be 
adjusting to capital requirements through “derisking” … Banks have been able to build 
regulatory capital by substituting assets (taking on assets that need less required capital)” 
(IMF, 2012, p. 83). Since “risk-weighted capital ratios can increase by increasing regulatory 
capital (the numerator) or by reducing risk-weighted assets (the denominator)” (Goodhart et 
al., 2004, p. 605), the observed trends suggest that banks have generally been trying to do the 
latter with various degrees of success. However, a reformulation of what constitutes risky 
assets may also generate distortions, because “risk measurement is complex” (ibid., p. 597) 
and “the resulting requirements will become dense and difficult” (ibid.). An additional 
mechanism dealing with risk attachment, the “leverage ratio”, has therefore been introduced 
to “act in tandem with the existing suite of risk-based capital ratios” (IMF, 2012, p. 116). 
This will prevent capital from falling below some minimum level due to complexity of 
definitions. However, as discussed in the model above, the “leverage ratio” by itself may 
create incentives to invest more in the risky asset. This has actually been observed previously, 
when “several jurisdictions relied solely on the leverage ratio, which created incentives for 
banks to allocate resources to higher-risk assets” (ibid.). Since the model above only deals 
with pure equity and does not illustrate the effect of both risk-weighted capital requirements 
and leverage ratio, it is unclear whether this regulation mechanism might generate the same 
type of incentives. Moreover, highly leveraged institutions may not necessarily suffer from 
credit risk, which capital is aimed at combatting. As pointed by Morris and Shin (2008, p. 
243), “the higher leverage of investment banks reflects both the relatively low credit risk of 
the assets held and the short-term nature of much of their claims and obligations”.  
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The level of risk-weighted capital requirements has been left unchanged by Basel III 
agreements, remaining at 8% as previously. However, because of “major changes in the 
composition of capital and in the definition of eligible capital, many banks will nonetheless 
have to raise capital to meet the new standards” (IMF, 2012, p. 116). Thinking in terms of 
the model above this might imply stricter capital requirements and a steeper capital cost 
function. This will, on the one hand, make banks that are bad at risk handling decrease their 
risky investments and improve on risk sharing. On the other hand, banks that are good at risk 
handling may want to decrease their risky investments as well, since for them the new capital 
buffers may be too high. If there is reason to believe that capital requirements are set at a high 
enough level, this may limit “the amount of maturity transformation banks can provide” (von 
Thadden, 2011, p. 47) and lead to a “stability-profitability trade-off” (ibid.). The result could 
be less provision of banking services and perhaps even some sort of underinvestment. In this 
situation, as stressed by Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995, p. 54), capital requirements would 
“involve a long-run social tradeoff between the benefits of reducing the risk of the negative 
externalities from bank failures and the costs of reducing bank intermediation”. Banks that 
are good at risk handling might then start looking for profits elsewhere and either turn to 
complex financial innovation or push “bank-like activities into some less-regulated nonbank 
financial institutions (the shadow banking system)” (IMF, 2012, p. 77). Of course, this would 
mean that the measure of systemic risk might become useless, because it would not account 
for risky investments in the non-bank sector. As noticed by Hellwig (2010, p. 3), before the 
financial crisis “excessive maturity transformation was due to the development of a shadow 
banking system”. The latter is “different than depository institutions, in that the activity 
involves the repo market, where depositors and lenders are individually matched” (Gorton, 
2009, p. 14). Current regulation requirements offer no mechanism of monitoring or 
controlling the non-bank sector and expansion of this sector will create need for more 
regulation. At the same time it is unclear how far this tendency might go, since banks may 
retain some advantages over non-bank financial institutions, such as “access to central bank 
liquidity support” (IMF, 2012, p. 85). Nevertheless, abstracting from the non-bank sector, if 
there is reason to believe that existing capital requirements are still not set at a high enough 
level, the regulatory community “should aim for substantially higher regulatory capital, well 
above ten percent and perhaps even closer to the twenty or thirty percent” (Hellwig, 2010, p. 
11) in order to secure financial stability. As demonstrated by the model above low capital 
requirements give banks that are bad at risk handling strongest incentives to increase their 
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risky investments and push the aggregate risk beyond the critical level. This view is shared by 
Harris and Raviv (2013, p. 4) who argue that due to lenient capital requirements “Basel III 
Accords … will not eliminate excessive risk taking”. 
Uncertainty about the sufficiency of current capital requirements arises due to the fact 
that information used to calculate such requirements is in reality private and often reported by 
the banks themselves. As illustrated by the model above, in order to set optimal capital 
requirements, regulators need detailed information on banks’ profit function and the 
individual probability of going bankrupt, not to mention information about risk handling 
ability. Since the introduction of Basel II framework regulation of the financial sector has 
been based on an idea that “banks are better informed about their risks than regulators” 
(Santos, 2000, p. 20). Financial institutions have therefore been allowed to make use of 
internal models, better known as Internal Ratings-Based Approach, in order to assess credit 
risks. The problem with this mechanism, however, is connected to truthful revelation of 
information. By underreporting real profits, exaggerating capital costs, manipulating risks 
through internal modeling or other “cosmetic adjustments” banks may affect regulation 
requirements and there is reason to believe that they will attempt to do so. As illustrated in the 
model above, degree of convexity and concavity of the functions constituting banks’ NPV are 
central for their mimicking incentives. Hellwig (2010, p. 9) argued that “the regulatory 
community knew that risk calibration was mainly a tool to reduce capital requirements”. 
Moreover, “the very attempt to calibrate regulatory capital towards measured risks might be 
responsible for the insufficiency of bank equity capital” (ibid., p. 5).  
The absence of regulation of banks’ refinancing risk has been considered “a critical 
gap in the Basel II framework” (Perotti, Suarez, 2011, p. 3). Attempts at its correction 
proposed by the Basel III Accord have already been called “the most daring and novel rules 
concerning bank liquidity” (von Thadden, 2011, p. 43). In the model above banks have an 
incentive to overinvest in the risky asset under competitive equilibrium due to existence of a 
negative externality. Optimal liquidity buffers are secured through distribution of prescribed 
investment in the risky alternative. This is somewhat different from reality, since Basel III 
does not aim at regulation of assets directly, but rather “targets the bank’s potential maturity 
mismatch” (von Thadden, 2011, p. 47). Regulation of assets in the model contributes to less 
investment in risky assets and secures optimal liquidity buffers. This may reduce reliance of 
financial institutions on the interbank market or provision of liquidity by the Central Bank. 
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Such development may prove beneficial for the financial system in the future, since “a key 
problem in the 2008 crisis, as in the looming European banking crisis of 2011, has been the 
failure of the interbank market” (ibid., p. 48). However, as discussed in the model above, 
large enough liquidity buffers for all types of banks can only be secured if risk-weighted 
capital requirements are set at the level where least capable banks do not have an incentive to 
mimic better risk-handling ability. If there is reason to believe that capital requirements are 
below that level, then banks with poor risk-handling ability will end up with suboptimal 
liquidity buffers. Some arrangement is then needed in order to secure provision of liquidity in 
times of stress. It has been observed that after the already mentioned failure of the interbank 
market Central Banks “have substituted for interbank lending” (IMF, 2012, p. 95). At the 
same time, as argued by Perotti and Suarez (2011, p. 6), “liquidity requirements would have 
to be increased in good times and reduced in bad times so as to avoid making them a source 
of further banking system procyclicality”. The Basel III does not currently address 
procyclicality of liquidity buffers. Furthermore, if one abstracts from effects of capital 
requirements for a moment, restrictions on assets are likely to create incentives to look for 
profits elsewhere and make banks turn to the non-bank sector. Since “nonbank financial 
institutions are largely unaffected by these changes, … [they] could benefit from moving of 
business in their direction” (IMF, 2012, p. 86). A trend of this sort has already been 
confirmed empirically: “progress on implementing the Basel III liquidity rules in a domestic 
context is prompting more nontraditional activities, especially larger holdings in other 
earning assets” (ibid., p. 110). As mentioned before, increased level of activity in the non-
bank sector might distort the measure of aggregate risk and deteriorate financial stability.  
The above trends suggest that financial regulation faces several important challenges. 
“The current approach to systemic regulation implicitly assumes that we can make the system 
as a whole safe by simply trying to make sure that individual banks are safe” (Brunnermeier 
et al., 2009, p. vii). Achieving this goal comes together with various inefficiencies that the 
regulators have to choose between. Because of countervailing incentives, the financial sector 
may either end up with too lenient regulation requirements or face migration of activity to the 
non-banking sector. Needless to say, both cases pose a threat to financial stability.  
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8 Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis has been to explore various issues connected to financial stability 
and the tradeoffs that the existing regulation mechanisms may generate. The starting point of 
the discussion has been a theoretical model representing an aggregation of financial 
institutions differing in their ability to handle risk. It was shown that in an unregulated 
equilibrium investment in risky assets generates a negative externality, which in turn poses a 
threat of systemic collapse. As a remedy to this potential problem three different regulation 
mechanisms have been considered, corresponding roughly to the liquidity ratio, risk-weighted 
capital requirements and the leverage ratio, as described by the Basel III Accord. It has been 
demonstrated that a combination of liquidity ratio and risk-weighted capital requirements that 
decrease in ability of risk handling may produce a Pareto-efficient outcome under perfect 
information. When information is asymmetric, however, banks get incentives to mimic better 
risk-handling ability in order to increase profits. A combination of the outlined liquidity 
regulation and leverage ratio is particularly favorable for such mimicking, since the bank size 
is assumed to be fixed in the model making the total cost of capital exogenous. In this case 
financial stability may be achieved at the cost of inefficient risk sharing and suboptimal 
liquidity and/or capital buffers depending on the strictness of capital requirements. Liquidity 
regulation in a combination with risk-weighted capital requirements may also generate 
mimicking incentives, especially if capital requirements are decreasing in risk handling 
ability. If, on the other hand, capital requirements are set at the same level for all banks and 
are used in combination with liquidity regulation, financial stability may be secured at the 
cost of inefficient risk sharing, suboptimal liquidity and capital buffers for some banks or, 
alternatively, general underinvestment. The predictions of the model regarding various 
tradeoffs seem to match several of the currently observed trends in connection with 
implementation of the Basel III Accord. An introduction of stricter definitions of what 
constitutes risk and capital has given rise to adjustment behavior, such as decreasing risky 
investments. Capital, on the other hand, has been slow to adjust. Even though derisking of 
asset portfolios may contribute to larger capital and liquidity buffers and in that way promote 
financial stability, there has been a concern that search for profits will drive bank activity to 
the unregulated non-bank sector. At the same time it is unclear whether current capital 
requirements are set at a high enough level, which is needed to prevent systemic collapse.  
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 The conclusions made in the present work have been based on a particular theoretical 
construction, which is not without its limitations. In particular, the model treats ability to 
handle risk as a source of bank heterogeneity. Since it is assumed that banks cannot improve 
on their risk handling, it is perhaps not surprising that when faced with regulation 
requirements that reduce their profits, financial institutions choose to adjust through 
mimicking. If effort and not ability was, for instance, the main source of heterogeneity, it 
would probably be desirable to motivate banks instead of holding them in place and could 
result in different conclusions. Furthermore, the model adopts a certain mechanism, through 
which systemic risk endangers economy, namely the aggregate investment in risky assets. In 
reality, it may be well other factors, such as spillover effects, that constitute a systemic threat. 
It has been pointed out, for instance, that “Lehman’s end-2007 balance sheet as a whole 
consisted of precisely the types of assets and liabilities that have low credit risk but high 
systemic impact” (Morris, Shin, 2008, p. 243). The absence of the interbank market is thus 
one of the main limitations of the present work. Finally, the model treats both assets and 
liabilities as consisting of just two alternatives. Of this reason it is possible to view restrictions 
on risky assets as a type of liquidity regulation. In reality, however, banks operate with many 
different types of risky assets, so restricting the latter would not necessarily affect liquidity 
buffers. Similarly, since the model only distinguishes between equity and demand deposits, it 
is not possible to illustrate the effect of risk-weighted capital requirements and leverage ratio 
simultaneously. It is perhaps not surprising that the leverage ratio, when viewed by itself, 
does not produce desired effects. After all, it is precisely the existence of different types of 
capital, such as subordinated debt and hybrid capital, which has justified the introduction of 
the leverage ratio in the Basel III Accord.   
 The results of the present paper demonstrate that financial stability is a complex issue, 
and both micro- and macroprudential regulation may be needed in order to prevent future 
financial crises. As pointed out by Morris and Shin (2008, p. 259), “taking care of the 
solvency of each individual institution ensures the stability of the system is not useful, because 
it does not address spillover effects”. Still, if some of the illustrations in the present work are 
correct, the microprudential regulation of the Basel agreements may need to be further 
improved on. Until the Basel III Accord is fully implemented it remains to see whether it has 
succeeded in dealing with these issues.  
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